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Research has illustrated that the brain regions implicated in moral cognition comprise a robust and broadly distributed network. However, understanding
how these brain regions interact and give rise to the complex interplay of cognitive processes underpinning humanmoral cognition is still in its infancy. We
used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine patterns of activation for difficult and easy moral decisions relative to matched non-moral
comparators. This revealed an activation pattern consistent with a relative functional double dissociation between the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and
ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Difficult moral decisions activated bilateral TPJ and deactivated the vmPFC and OFC. In contrast, easy moral
decisions revealed patterns of activation in the vmPFC and deactivation in bilateral TPJ and dorsolateral PFC. Together these results suggest that moral
cognition is a dynamic process implemented by a distributed network that involves interacting, yet functionally dissociable networks.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, neuroscientists exploring moral cognition have
used brain imaging data to map a ‘moral network’ within the brain
(Young and Dungan, 2011). This network encompasses circuits impli-
cated in social, emotional and executive processes. For example, moral
emotions appear to activate the limbic system (Shin et al., 2000) and
temporal poles (Decety et al., 2011), while reasoned moral judgments
reliably engage fronto-cortical areas (Berthoz et al., 2002;
Heekeren et al., 2003; Kedia et al., 2008; Harenski et al., 2010). The
distributed nature of the network reflects the fact that prototypical
moral challenges recruit a broad spectrum of cognitive processes: infer-
ring people’s intentions, integrating social norms, computing
goal-directed actions, identifying with others and displaying empathic
behavior (Moll et al., 2008).
The initial focus within the research field was to explore whether
moral decisions have a specific neural signature. This reflected the early
dominance of neurocognitive models which argued for the unique
properties of moral deliberation. One such theory endorsed the idea
that we are endowed with an innate human moral faculty: our moral
judgments are mediated by an unconscious mechanism which evalu-
ates good vs bad (Hauser, 2006). Another theory suggested that moral
choices are driven by intuitive emotions: in other words, we feel our
way through knowing what is right and wrong (Haidt, 2001).
However, as the imaging data accumulated, the theoretical emphasis
shifted toward the view that the psychological processes underlying
moral choices recruit socio-emotional and cognitive processes that
are domain general (Moll et al., 2005). As opposed to a unique
moral faculty, the evidence reflected the fact that moral choices reliably
engage a delineated neural network which is also observed within the
non-moral domain (Young and Dungan, 2011). In line with this view,
one theory postulates that emotional processes and reason work in
competition: controlled processes of cognition and automatic pro-
cesses of emotion vie with each other to ‘work out’ a moral judgment
(Greene et al., 2001). An alternative model suggests that reason and
emotion do not act as competitive systems, but instead interact in a
continuously integrated and parallel fashion (Moll et al., 2008).
Reflecting this theoretical shift, more recent research efforts have
used experimental probes to fractionate the moral network into con-
stituent parts and illustrate relative dissociations. That is, distinct
regions of the broad moral network are responsible for different
putative components of moral cognition, and this likely mirrors
domain-general processing distinctions. For example, there is now a
compelling body of evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
underpins processes of error detection and conflict monitoring across
multiple cognitive contexts. This knowledge has been fruitfully applied
to the moral domain in work showing that high-conflict moral di-
lemmaswhen compared with low-conflict moral dilemmasrecruit
the ACC (Greene et al., 2004). Similarly, the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ) seems to subserve the general capacity to think about another’s
perspective in socially contextualized situations and is reliably activated
when participants deliberate over moral dilemmas where the ability to
appreciate the interpersonal impact of a decision is paramount (Young
et al., 2007, 2011; Young and Saxe, 2009). This approach has also
proved productive in elucidating the role of the ventro-medial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC) in coding socio-emotional knowledge, such as
stereotypes (Gozzi et al., 2009) and moral emotionssuch as pride
(Tangney et al., 2007), embarrassment (Zahn et al., 2009) and guilt
(Moll et al., 2011). Likewise, the dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC) appears to
underpin cognitive control, reasoned thinking (Mansouri et al., 2009),
abstract moral principles (Moll et al., 2002) and sensitivity to unfair-
ness (Sanfey et al., 2003). Finally, a similar rationale has informed
research controlling for cognitive load (Greene et al., 2008), semantic
content (Takahashi et al., 2004), emotional arousal and regulation
(Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Decety et al., 2011), probability
(Shenhav and Greene, 2010), intent (Berthoz et al., 2002; Young
and Saxe, 2011) and harm (Kedia et al., 2008), in each case revealing
distinct patterns of neural activation within the broader moral
network.
Although this broad approach of deconstructing the moral network
has clearly been very productive, it rests on an important assumption:
that we can experimentally isolate different components of the moral
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network in the brain by varying the relevant processing
parameters (conflict, harm, intent and emotion) while keeping
others constant (Christensen and Gomila, 2012). Another possibility
of course is that varying any given parameter of a moral decision has
effects on how other involved parameters operate. In other
words, components of the moral network may be fundamentally
interactive.
This study investigated this issue by building on prior research
examining the neural substrates of high-conflict (difficult) vs low-con-
flict (easy) moral decisions (Greene et al., 2004). Consider for example
the following two moral scenarios. First, while hiding with your family
during wartime your baby starts to cry; would you suffocate your
crying baby in order to save the rest of your family from being dis-
covered and killed by soldiers? Second, you are out with your family
when you come across a child who has clearly been assaulted and is
lying by the side of the road crying; do you assist them and call for
help? Both of these decisions involve processing of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
in terms of socially constructed moral rules. Both also have emotion-
ally laden consequences and require processing of others’ points of
view (theory of mind). However, the first decision feels much more
difficult than the second, involves a greater degree of mental conflict,
will elicit more deliberation and will be met with less unanimity as to
the ‘correct’ choice (Greene et al., 2004). Together, these two scenarios
clearly represent the ends of a moral continuum and offer a powerful
illustration of the extent to which moral decisions can engage us in
very discrepant ways.
The key question is exactly how patterns of neural activation in the
moral network might differ when processing these varied classes of
moral challenge. One possibility is that network activation will only
differ as a function of the different cognitive parameters recruited (i.e.
conflict resolution, engagement of systems involved in deliberative
reasoning). If this were the case, difficult moral decisions may only
differ from easy moral decisions in their recruitment of the dlPFC and
ACC (Greene et al., 2004). However, another possibility is that varying
decision difficulty will have interactive effects on the recruitment of
other components of the moral network. In other words, both classes
of moral choice might require significant and broadly comparable ap-
preciation of how the people involved will be affected by any choice
that is made (i.e. theory of mind). If this were the case, mPFC and
TPJregions known to be associated with perspective takingmay be
recruited for both difficult and easy decisions. Such a finding would
suggest that a shared cognitive process underlies a broad spectrum of
moral challenges. However, it is also plausible that easy moral deci-
sions solely rely on automatic and reflexive processingwhich is often
associated with limbic activation (Moll et al., 2005). A further possi-
bility is that the interplay and interactive effect of these various cog-
nitive processes may engage some regions while disengaging others.
For example, an easier moral decision may elicit less activation (or
even deactivation) in the dlPFC simply because any dlPFC engagement
would be redundant, or even a source of interference, when choices are
reflexive and automatic.
We sought to investigate these various possibilities using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants negotiated dif-
ficult vs easy moral decisions. Critically, we also included matched
difficult and easy non-moral decision conditions. This allowed us to
evaluate not only differences within the moral domain as a function of
decision difficulty but also to investigate whether manipulation of ‘dif-
ficulty’ changes the pattern of activation in other regions of the moral
networkrelative to activation patterns for comparable non-moral
choices. In other words, does moral cognition make flexible use of
different regions of the moral network as a function of the demands
of the moral challenge?
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Overall, 89 subjects participated in the research reported here.
Fifty-one subjects assisted us in rating the scenarios (mean age 29.6
years and s.d. 7.2; 30 females). Thirty-eight subjects (all right handed,
mean age 24.6 years and s.d. 3.8; 22 females) participated in the main
experiment and underwent fMRI. Three additional subjects were
excluded from fMRI analyses due to errors in acquiring scanning
images. Subjects were compensated for their time and travel. All sub-
jects were right-handed, had normal or corrected vision and were
screened to ensure no history of psychiatric or neurological problems.
All subjects gave informed consent, and the study was approved by the




In an initial stage of materials development, we created four categories
of scenario for use in the imaging study: Difficult Moral Scenarios;
Easy Moral Scenarios; Difficult Non-Moral Scenarios and Easy
Non-Moral Scenarios. To achieve this, subjects (N¼ 51) were pre-
sented with a set of 65 moral and non-moral scenarios and asked
which action they thought they would take in the depicted situation
(a binary decision), how comfortable they were with their choice (on a
five-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘very comfortable’ to ‘not at all
comfortable’), and how difficult the choice was (on a five-point Likert
scale, ranging from ‘very difficult’ to ‘not at all difficult’). This initial
stimulus pool included a selection of 15 widely used scenarios from the
extant literature (Greene et al., 2001; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006;
Crockett et al., 2010; Kahane et al., 2012; Tassy et al., 2012) as well as
50 additional scenarios describing more everyday moral dilemmas that
we created ourselves. These additional 50 scenarios were included be-
cause many of the scenarios in the existing literature describe extreme
and unfamiliar situations (e.g. deciding whether to cut off a child’s arm
to negotiate with a terrorist). Our aim was for these additional scen-
arios to be more relevant to subjects’ backgrounds and understanding
of established social norms and moral rules (Sunstein, 2005). The add-
itional scenarios mirrored the style and form of the scenarios sourced
from the literature, however they differed in content. In particular, we
over-sampled moral scenarios for which we anticipated subjects would
rate the decision as very easy to make (e.g. would you pay $10 to save
your child’s life?), as this category is vastly under-represented in the
existing literature. These scenarios were intended as a match for
non-moral scenarios that we assumed subjects would classify as elicit-
ing ‘easy’ decisions [e.g. would you forgo using walnuts in a recipe if
you do not like walnuts? (Greene et al., 2001)]a category of scenarios
that is routinely used in the existing literature as control stimuli.
Categorization of scenarios as moral vs non-moral was carried out
by the research team prior to this rating exercise. To achieve this, we
applied the definition employed by Moll et al., (2008), which states
that moral cognition altruistically motivates social behavior. In other
words, choices, which can either negatively or positively affect others in
significant ways, were classified as reflecting moral issues. Independent
unanimous classification by the three authors was required before as-
signing scenarios to the moral vs non-moral category. In reality, there
was unanimous agreement for every scenario rated.
We used the participants’ ratings to operationalize the concepts of
‘easy’ and ‘difficult’. First, we examined participants’ actual yes/no
decisions in response to the scenarios. We defined difficult scenarios
as those where there was little consensus about what the ‘correct’ de-
cision should be and retained only those where the subjects were more
or less evenly split as to what to do (scenarios where the mean
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proportion of responses was between 0.45 and 0.55 on the binary
choice). In contrast, we defined easy scenarios as those where there
was a strong consensus (either >0.80 or <0.20).
For these retained scenarios, we then examined participants’ actual
difficulty ratings. Scenarios that consistently (80% of the time)
received high ratings of ‘difficulty’ (four or five on our five-point
scale) or high ratings of ‘easy’ (one or two on the scale) were categor-
ized as Difficult or Easy scenarios, respectively. This gave us 24 scen-
arios in the final set, 6 in each of our four categories (difficulty scores
for each category: DM mean 3.2, s.d. 0.71; DNM 2.9, s.d. 0.70; EM
1.2, s.d. 0.28; ENM mean 1.3, s.d. 0.35). Of these 24, 6 came from
the stimulus set drawn from the existing literature (Greene et al., 2001)
and a further 18 came from our supplementary set.
We then carried out a number of additional checks of potential
between-category differences that we felt might drive behavioral and
neural responses in our study. Consequently, we had a subset of the
subjects (n¼ 15) rate each scenario on four further dimensions, all on
five-point Likert scales. These comprised: (i) How much effort is
required to complete the action resulting from your decision?; (ii)
How much effort is required to weigh up each aspect/component of
this scenario?; (iii) How many aspects/components did you consider
when making your decision? and (iv) How emotionally involving is
this scenario?
We wanted to ensure that the two sets of Difficult scenarios were
rated as more effortful and complex (ratings, 1, 2 and 3) than the two
sets of Easy scenarios, but that there were no differences on these
ratings within the Difficult and Easy pairings. The data showed that
this was the case [main effects of difficulty for the ratings 1, 2 and 3
(Fs > 49.74, Ps < 0.000), but no effects of difficulty within the pairings].
We also wanted to verify that the two sets of Moral scenarios were
rated as more emotive (as we would predict) than the two sets of
Non-Moral scenarios (as was the case, t¼13.37; P< 0.001; paired
samples t-test, two-tailed), but that there were no differences within
either the Moral or Non-Moral pairings (paired ts < 0.18) importantly
illustrating that the difficult and easy scenarios in the moral and
non-moral domains were matched on how emotionally involving
they were. Finally, we ensured that the stimuli were matched for
word length across categories [(F(3,20)¼ 0.51, P¼ 0.68); DM word
count (mean 86.3, s.d. 25.3); EM word count (mean 92.0, s.d.
20.1); DNM word count (mean 90.2, s.d. 18.6) and ENM word
count (mean 79.3, s.d. 9.7)].
Functional MRI procedure
Within the scanner, subjects were presented with the 24 written scen-
arios. We structured our task using an event-related design, which
closely mimicked past fMRI designs within this literature (Greene
et al., 2001). Scenarios were randomly presented in a series of four
blocks with six trials (scenarios) per block. Each trial was presented as
text through a series of two screens, the first of which described the
short scenario and the second of which asked whether the subject
would do the relevant action, requiring a yes/no button press
(Figure 1a). Subjects read each scenario and question at their own
pace (up to 25 s for the scenario and 15 s to make their choice) and
pressed a button to advance through the screens. Between each trial, a
fixation cross was displayed for 2 s. At the end of each block, there was
an inter-block-interval (IBI) of 16 s to allow the hemodynamic re-
sponse function to return to baseline. Baseline was defined as the
mean signal across the last four images of this 16 s IBI. Neural activity
was measured using the floating window method (Greene et al., 2001).
This method isolates the decision phase by including the time around
the decision8 s before the response, 1 s during the response and 6 s
following the responsefor a total of 15 s of recorded activity for every
response. The rationale for using the floating window approach is to
not only account for the 4–6 s delay following a psychological event in
the hemodynamic response but also to create a flexible analysis struc-
ture for a complex, self-paced task.
Imaging acquisition
MRI scanning was conducted at the Medical Research Council
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit on a Siemens 3-Tesla Tim Trio
MRI scanner by using a head coil gradient set. Whole-brain data
were acquired with echoplanar T2* weighted imaging, sensitive to
BOLD signal contrast (48 sagittal slices, 3 mm-thickness;
TR¼ 2400 ms; TE¼ 30 ms; flip angle¼ 788 and FOV 192 mm). To
provide for equilibration effects, the first 8 vol were discarded. T1
Fig. 1 (a) Experimental design. Subjects were presented with each scenario over two screens, the first describing the scenario and the second posing a question about their response to it. Subjects were
required to select yes or no to make a choice. A fixation cross was presented for 2 s at the start of each trial. (b) Difficulty ratings from the subjects completing the fMRI study revealed that the categories
Difficult/Easy and Moral/Non-Moral were controlled and matched across condition as rated on a five-point Likert scale.
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weighted structural images were acquired at a resolution of
1 1 1 mm.
Imaging processing
Statistical parametric mapping software (SPM5: www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/software/spm5/) was used to analyze all data. Preprocessing of
fMRI data included spatial realignment, coregistration, normalization
and smoothing. The first eight scans were discarded as dummy scans.
To control for motion, all functional volumes were realigned to the
mean volume. Images were spatially normalized to standard space
using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template with a
voxel size of 3 3 3 mm and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel
with an isotropic full width at half maximum of 8 mm. Additionally,
high-pass temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128 s was applied to
remove low-frequency drifts in signal.
Data analysis
After preprocessing, statistical analysis was performed using the general
linear model. Activated voxels were identified using an event-related
statistical model representing each of the response events, convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function and mean corrected.
Six head-motion parameters defined by the realignment were added to
the model as regressors of no interest. Analysis was carried out to
establish each participant’s voxel-wise activation when subjects made
their response regarding each scenario (the aforementioned fixed 15 s
floating window approach). For each subject, contrast images were
calculated for each of the four scenario categories. These first level
contrasts were then aggregated into second level full factorial analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) in order to compute group statistics.
We report activity at P< 0.001 uncorrected for multiple spatial com-
parisons across the whole brain, and P< 0.05 family wise error (FWE)
corrected for the following a priori regions of interest (ROIs; attained
by independent coordinates): TPJ, ACC, dlPFC and vmPFC, reflecting
the ‘moral network’ (coordinates listed in tables). Coordinates were
taken from previous related studies.
RESULTS
Manipulation check: behavioral data
To validate our a priori allocation of scenarios to the Easy and Difficult
categories based on participants’ ratings, we administered a post-scan
questionnaire to assess how difficult the fMRI subjects reported finding
the scenarios using the same five-point Likert scale of difficulty. A
repeated measures ANOVA with two within-subjects factors:
Difficulty (difficult and easy) and Morality (moral and non-moral)
confirmed the expected main effect of difficulty (F(1,36)¼ 287.27,
P< 0.001), with Difficult scenarios rated as more difficult than Easy
scenarios (Figure 1b). As anticipated, the main effect of morality and
the morality by difficulty interaction were not significant, indicating
that there was no support for self-reported differences in difficulty
between moral and non-moral scenarios and no support for any dif-
ferential discrepancy between difficult vs easy scenarios in the moral
compared with non-moral domains (Fs < 2.62, Ps > 0.13).
As a further validation of our a priori categorization of scenarios as
Difficult or Easy, we also examined response patterns for each of the
different categories. Subjects had near perfect agreement in their re-
sponses for Easy decisions (98% of the subjects responded in the same
manner). However, for Difficult scenarios, there was little consensus in
response selection (only 57% of the subjects responded in the same
manner). A repeated measures ANOVA exploring reaction times
(Greene et al., 2004) offered further support for this Difficult–Easy
distinction, as Difficult scenarios (mean 4.0 s, s.d. 1.6) took signifi-
cantly longer to respond to than Easy scenarios (mean 3.1 s, s.d. 1.1)
(F(1,36)¼ 24.34, P< 0.000). Interestingly, moral scenarios (mean
3.65 s, s.d. 0.14) also took slightly longer to respond to relative to
non-moral scenarios (mean 3.43 s, s.d. 0.15), likely reflecting their
higher emotional impact (F(1,36)¼ 5.35, P¼ 0.027). There was there-
fore also a significant Difficulty by morality interaction
(F(1,36)¼ 143.14, P< 0.000), reflecting the fact that the moral–diffi-
cult scenarios took the longest to respond to.
IMAGING RESULTS
We contrasted neural activation associated with making a decision for
each of the four categories against one another: Easy Moral, Difficult
Moral, Difficult Non-Moral and Easy Non-Moral. To explore potential
interactions among the four conditions and to verify that overall the
current scenarios elicited activations consistent with the moral network
described in the literature (Moll, Zahn et al., 2005), we ran a full
factorial MoralityDifficulty ANOVA (MoralityDifficulty inter-
action). A whole-brain analysis of the interaction term (thresholded
at P¼ 0.001 uncorrected) revealed a robust network of areas including
bilateral TPJ, mid temporal poles, vmPFC, dACC and dlPFC (Figure 2;
a full list of coordinates can be found in Table 1). We then examined a
priori ROIs (Greene et al., 2001; Young and Saxe, 2009) (thresholded at
FWE P¼ 0.05) to determine if this network specifically overlapped
with the regions delineated within the literature. As expected, the
vmPFC, ACC and bilateral TPJ ROIs revealed significant activation
for the interaction term. The interaction term qualified significant
main effects of Morality and Difficulty. Although these activations
are suprasumed by the interaction, for completeness, we report then
in Tables 2 and 3.
As this initial full factorial analysis identified brain areas differing in
activity as a function of the interaction of the Morality and Difficulty
factors (the TPJ, dACC and vmPFC), our next aim was to deconstruct
these interactions to examine functionality within those regions for
Difficult and Easy Moral decisions relative to the matched
Non-Moral comparison conditions.
First, in order to understand which areas are differentially more
activated for difficult moral decisions, we compared Difficult Moral
with Difficult Non-Moral scenarios (DM > DN) at the whole-brain
level. This revealed a network starting at the TPJ and extending the
length of the temporal lobe into the temporal pole (Figure 3a and
Table 4). These findings demonstrate that difficult moral choices acti-
vate a network within the temporal lobeareas implicated in theory of
mind (Young and Saxe, 2009), attentional switching (Tassy et al.,
2012), higher order social concepts (Moll et al., 2008) and the under-
standing of social cues (Van Overwalle, 2009).
To reveal brain regions demonstrating relative decreases in activity
for difficult moral decisions, Difficult Non-Moral scenarios were con-
trasted with Difficult Moral scenarios (DN > DM), revealing vmPFC
and bilateral orbital frontal cortex (OFC) deactivation (Figure 3a
and Table 5). Thus, regions often associated with the moral network
were found to be relatively less activated during difficult moral
(vs non-moral) decisions once the difficulty of the scenario was
controlled for.
Using a similar rationale, we compared Easy Moral decisions with
Easy Non-Moral decisions (EM > EN), revealing activation of the
vmPFCan area known to integrate emotion into decision making
and planning (Moretto et al., 2010). Research has also shown that
patients suffering damage to the vmPFC exhibit poor practical judg-
ment (Raine and Yang, 2006; Blair, 2008). Interestingly, there was a
pattern of TPJ and dlPFC relative deactivation for Easy Moral decisions
(EN > EM) (Figure 3b and Tables 6 and 7).
Taken together, these patterns of activation and deactivation high-
light that difficult moral decisions appear to differentially recruit the
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TPJ and deactivate the vmPFC, while easy moral decisions appear to
differentially deactivate the TPJ and activate the vmPFC, relative to the
appropriate non-moral controls. These findings therefore suggest a
degree of relative functional dissociation between the TPJ and
vmPFC for moral decision making. The TPJ was selectively more
engaged for difficult moral decisions, while in contrast, the vmPFC
was selectively more activated for easy moral decisions, suggesting that
these regions have different functional roles in the moral network.
To identify whether this activation and deactivation pattern asso-
ciated with making difficult moral decisions overlapped with the net-
work showing the reverse pattern implicated in making easy moral
decisions, we performed a conjunction analysis. We first applied a
conjunction to the contrasts Difficult Moral > Difficult Non-Moral
Fig. 2 F-test examining the interaction of the factors Morality and Difficulty. This contrast reveals activation of the moral network traditionally described in the literature, consisting of the TPJ (bilaterally),
vmPFC, dlPFC and dACC. The red circles indicate the location of the regions used in the ROI analysis (taken from a priori coordinates), all thresholded at P< 0.05 FWE.
Table 1 ANOVA F-test interaction Morality Difficulty
Region Peak MNI coordinates F-statistic/z-value
Medial OFC 0 56 2 21.89/4.36
Left ACC 10 42 4 17.95/3.95
Left dlPFC 24 52 10 14.13/3.49
Right TPJ 56 40 4 20.17/4.19
Right TPJ 58 52 14 13.73/3.43
Left TPJ 56 52 2 16.67/3.80
Left TPJ 50 52 12 14.23/3.50
Left ACC 6 28 30 18.30/3.98
Right mid frontal gyrus 38 12 30 15.32/3.64
Left precentral gyrus 52 2 48 13.75/3.44
Right precentral gyrus 46 8 36 11.54/3.71
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates F-statistic/z-value
aACC 0 34 26 18.30/3.98
aMiddle frontal gyrus 28 49 7 14.13/3.49
bRight TPJ 54 59 22 12.44/3.36
bRight TPJ 54 52 16 13.73/3.44
bRight TPJ 52 54 22 13.04/3.34
bLeft TPJ 52 58 20 11.14/3.07
bvmPFC 2 58 17 11.57/3.13
bvmPFC 2 62 16 12.56/3.28
bvmPFC 2 50 10 21.61/4.33
bvmPFC 4 50 4 21.89/4.36
Notes: We used a priori coordinates to define ROI in our analysis. All ROIs were selected on the basis
of independent coordinates using a sphere of 10 mm and corrected at P< 0.05 FWE and were
attained through MarsBaRs. Peak voxels are presented in the tables at P < 0.001 uncorrected and all
images are shown at P < 0.005 uncorrected. Cluster size was defined by a minimum of 10 contiguous
voxels. All coordinates are in MNI Space. ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a
priori independent coordinates from previous studies: aGreene et al. (2004) and bYoung and Saxe
(2009).
Table 4 Difficult Moral > Difficult Non-Moral (DM > DN)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
Right mid temporal lobe 56 2 14 4.04
Right TPJ 56 52 14 3.55
Left TPJ 40 58 16 3.74
Right mid temporal lobe 50 16 14 3.52
Left mid temporal lobe 64 56 10 3.61
Left post central gyrus 54 6 46 3.17
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-Statistic
aLeft TPJ 58 66 22 2.84
aRight TPJ 54 52 16 3.64
aRight TPJ 54 59 22 3.56
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P< 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
Table 3 Main effect of Morality (DMþ DN > EMþ EN)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
TPJ 44 78 34 3.82
See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
Table 2 Main effect of Difficulty (DMþ DN > EMþ EN)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
vmPFC 4 55 12 3.10
See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
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(DM > DN) and Easy Non-Moral > Easy Moral (EN > EM) to clarify
whether the TPJ activation associated with the former and the TPJ
deactivation associated with the latter were occurring within the
same region. A whole-brain analysis revealed bilateral TPJ activation,
however, when a priori (Berthoz et al., 2002) ROIs were applied, only
the LTPJ survived SVC correction at P< 0.05 FWE (Figure 3c and
Table 8). We also ran a conjunction analysis for Easy Moral > Easy
Non-Moral (EM > EN) and Difficult Non-Moral > Difficult Moral
(DN > DM) to determine whether the vmPFC activations and deacti-
vations found in the original set of contrasts shared a common net-
work. We found robust activity within the vmPFC region both at a
whole-brain uncorrected level and when a priori (Young and Saxe,
2009) ROIs were applied (Figure 3c and Table 9).
We next investigated whether difficult moral decisions exhibited a
neural signature that is distinct to easy moral decisions for our scen-
arios. By directly comparing Difficult Moral to Easy Moral decisions
(DM > EM), bilateral TPJ as well as the right temporal pole were acti-
vated specifically for Difficult Moral decisions (Figure 4a and
Table 10). A direct contrast of Easy Moral compared with Difficult
Moral (EM > DM) revealed a network comprised of the Left OFC
(extending into the superior frontal gyrus), vmPFC and middle cin-
gulate (Figure 4b and Table 11). Interestingly, these results diverge
from past findings which indicated that the dlPFC and ACC underpin
difficult moral decisions (relative to easy moral decisions), while the
TPJ and middle temporal gyrus code for easy moral decisions (relative
to difficult moral decisions) (Greene et al., 2004). One explanation for
these differential findings may be that in our task, we independently
categorized scenarios as difficult vs easy prior to scanning, instead of
using each participant’s response latencies as a metric of the difficulty
of the moral dilemma (Greene et al., 2004).
Fig. 3 (a) Whole-brain images for the contrast Difficult Moral > Difficult Non-Moral scenarios. The TPJ was activated (shown in yellow) while the vmPFC and bilateral OFC were deactivated (shown in blue:
computed as Difficult Non-Moral > Difficult Moral). (b) Whole-brain images for contrast Easy Moral > Easy Non-Moral scenarios. The vmPFC was activated (shown in yellow) while the TPJ and dlPFC were
deactivated (shown in blue: computed as Easy Non-Moral > Easy Moral scenarios). (c) A priori ROIs (indicated by red circles, corrected at FWE P < 0.05, are shown for the conjunction analysis of contrasts
illustrated in Figure 3a and b (vmPFC [-2 54 -4] and TPJ [-52 -46 4]).
Table 5 Difficult Non-Moral > Difficult Moral (DN > DM)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
MCC 0 28 34 4.66
vmPFC 0 54 2 3.37
Right OFC 22 46 12 3.98
Left OFC 26 48 12 4.01
Left anterior insula 32 16 10 3.37
Right anterior insula 36 18 10 3.24
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
aACC 0 34 26 4.84
aMiddle frontal gyrus 28 49 7 4.20
bvmPFC 2 50 10 3.47
bvmPFC 4 50 4 3.76
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P< 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from previous
studies: aGreene et al. (2004) and bYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
Table 6 Easy Moral > Easy Non-Moral (EM > EN)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
vmPFC 2 54 4 3.64
vmPFC 12 46 6 3.19
ACC 6 30 6 3.32
PCC 2 60 26 3.00
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
avmPFC 2 50 10 3.73
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
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DISCUSSION
The aim of the study reported here was to examine how the brain
processes various classes of moral choices and to ascertain whether
specific and potentially dissociable functionality can be mapped
within the brain’s moral network. Our behavioral findings confirmed
that difficult moral decisions require longer response times, elicit little
consensus over the appropriate response and engender high ratings of
discomfort. In contrast, easy moral and non-moral dilemmas were
answered quickly, elicited near perfect agreement for responses and
created minimal discomfort. These differential behavioral profiles
had distinct neural signatures within the moral network: relative to
the appropriate non-moral comparison conditions, difficult moral di-
lemmas selectively engaged the bilateral TPJ but deactivated the
vmPFC, while easy moral dilemmas revealed the reverse findinggrea-
ter vmPFC activation and less engagement of the TPJ. These results
suggest a degree of functional dissociation between the TPJ and
vmPFC for moral decisions and indicate that these cortical regions
have distinct roles. Together, our findings support the notion that,
rather than comprising a single mental operation, moral cognition
makes Fexible use of different regions as a function of the particular
demands of the moral dilemma.
Our neurobiological results show consistency with the existing re-
search on moral reasoning (Moll et al., 2008) which identifies both the
TPJ and vmPFC as integral players in social cognition (Van Overwalle,
2009; Janowski et al., 2013). The vmPFC has largely been associated
with higher ordered deliberation (Harenski et al., 2010), morally sali-
ent contexts (Moll et al., 2008) and emotionally engaging experiences
(Greene et al., 2001). Clinical data have further confirmed these find-
ings: patients with fronto-temporal dementia (FTD)deterioration of
the PFCexhibit blunted emotional responses and diminished em-
pathy when responding to moral dilemmas (Mendez et al., 2005).
Additionally, lesions within the vmPFC produce a similar set of be-
haviors (Anderson et al., 1999). Unlike healthy controls, vmPFC pa-
tients consistently endorse the utilitarian response when presented
with high-conflict moral dilemmas, despite the fact that such a re-
sponse often has an emotionally aversive consequence (Koenigs
et al., 2007). This clinical population is unable to access information
that indicates a decision might be emotionally distressing, and they
therefore rely on explicit norms that maximize aggregate welfare. This
signifies that the vmPFC likely plays a role in generating pro-social
sentiments such as compassion, guilt, harm aversion and interpersonal
attachment (Moll et al., 2008).
In the experiment presented here, differential activity was observed
within the vmPFC in response to easy moral dilemmas, suggesting that
when a moral dilemma has a clear, obvious and automatic choice (e.g.
pay $10 to save your child’s life), this region supports a neural repre-
sentation of the most motivationally compelling and ‘morally guided’
option. In other words, the vmPFC appears sensitive to a decision that
has a low cost and high benefit result. This converges with the evidence
that this area is critical for the experience of pro-social sentiments
(Moll et al., 2008) and fits with the extant research demonstrating a
strong association between the subjective value of reward and vmPFC
activity (Hare et al., 2010). Because our moral scenarios were matched
for emotional engagement, it seems unlikely that the vmPFC is only
coding for the emotional component of the moral challenge. We
speculated that when presented with an easy moral dilemma, the
vmPFC may also be coding for both the subjective reward value and
the pro-social nature of making a decision which produces a highly
positive outcome.
Interestingly, when a moral dilemma is relatively more difficult, less
activation within the vmPFC was observed. The nature of these more
difficult moral scenarios is that there is no salient or motivationally
compelling ‘correct’ choice. The options available to subjects elicit no
explicit morally guided choice and are instead unpleasant and often
even aversive (indicated by subjects’ discomfort ratings). As a result,
subjects understandably appear to be more reflective in their decision
making, employing effortful deliberation (longer response latencies)
during which they may be creating extended mental simulations of
each available option (Evans, 2008). Thus, if the vmPFC is specifically
coding the obvious and easy pro-social choice, then it is reasonable to
assume that when there is no clear morally guided option, the vmPFC
is relatively disengaged. This may be due to simple efficiencysuppres-
sion of activity in one region facilitates activity in another region. For
example, any activity in the vmPFC might represent a misleading
signal that there is a pro-social choice when there is not. In fact, pa-
tients with vmPFC lesions lack the requisite engagement of this region,
and as a result, show behavioral abnormalities when presented with
high-conflict moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007).
In contrast to easy moral dilemmas, difficult moral dilemmas
showed relatively increased activity in the TPJ, extending down
Table 7 Easy Non-Moral > Easy Moral (EN > EM)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
Right TPJ 54 44 14 4.55
Left TPJ 52 50 14 3.80
Right dlPFC 46 12 50 3.87
Right dlPFC 52 16 28 3.43
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
aLeft TPJ 51 46 4 3.17
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aBerthoz et al. (2002). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
Table 8 Conjunction Difficult Moral > Difficult Non-Moral (DM > DN)þ Easy
Non-Moral > Easy Moral (EN > EM)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
Right TPJ 56 42 0 2.80
Left TPJ 56 54 2 2.79
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
aLeft TPJ 52 46 4 2.83
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aBerthoz et al. (2002). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
Table 9 Conjunction Easy Moral > Easy Non-Moral (EM > EN)þ Difficult
Non-Moral > Difficult Moral (DN > DM)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
vmPFC 0 56 0 3.27
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-Statistic
avmPFC 4 50 4 3.37
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
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through the temporal poles. This activation pattern fits well with the
fMRI documentation that the TPJ is integral in processing a diverse
spectrum of social cognitive abilities such as empathy, theory of mind
(Young and Saxe, 2009), agency and more basic processes such as
attentional switching (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Converging evidence
from clinical work has further implicated the TPJ in both mentalizing
about the states of another, as well as attentional and spatial
orientation (unilateral spatial neglect) (Mesulam, 1981). For example,
during theory of mind tasks, subjects with autism either demonstrate
abnormal TPJ activity (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) or fail to activate the
TPJ altogether (Castelli et al., 2002). Similar atypical TPJ activation was
also found in autistic subjects who completed an attentional resource
distribution task (Gomot et al., 2006) and demonstrated difficulty in
Fig. 4 (a) Whole-brain images for the contrast Difficult Moral > Easy Moral scenarios. Bilateral TPJ regions were activated and a priori ROIs were applied to these areas. Parameter estimates of the beta values
indicate that the TPJ regions activate significantly more for Difficult Moral decisions than for Easy Moral decisions (b) Whole-brain images for the contrast Easy Moral > Difficult Moral scenarios reveal significant
dACC and OFC activation. A priori ROIs were applied and parameter estimates of the beta values revealed that the dACC and OFC activate significantly more for Easy Moral decisions than for Difficult Moral
decisions.
Table 11 Easy Moral > Difficult Moral (EM > DM)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
Left OFC 34 50 10 3.75
Right OFC 30 62 4 3.00
Left superior frontal gyrus 20 54 6 3.47
MCC 6 24 38 3.41
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
aACC 0 34 26 3.24
aMiddle frontal gyrus 28 49 7 3.59
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aGreene et al. (2004). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
Table 10 Difficult Moral > Easy Moral (DM > EM)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z-value
Right TPJ 62 54 14 3.55
Left TPJ 38 60 18 3.26
Right temporal pole 56 0 18 3.26
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
aRight TPJ 54 52 16 3.63
aLeft TPJ 46 62 25 3.32
ROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.
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processing novel stimuli. Together, this research indicates that the TPJ
seems to play a critical role in comparing and assessing socially salient
stimuli (Decety and Lamm, 2007).
Based on these findings, we reasoned that more difficult moral de-
cisionswhich are not associated with normatively ‘correct’ choi-
cesmay rely more on reflective cognitive systems partly localized
within the TPJ. Our behavioral data indicate that the major difference
between difficult and easy dilemmas is not only the number of elem-
ents one must evaluate in order to make a decision but how much
effort is required to do so. Thus, we speculated that the TPJ may
process difficult dilemmas in two stages: the TPJ first subsumes the
allocation of attentional resources to attend to the numerous socially
relevant stimuli and is then critically implicated in the assessment of
these stimuli to select the most compelling option. In short, the TPJ
could be involved in attending to, shifting between, and then weighing
up the salient nature of a difficult moral dilemma.
However, this neural result is not found when difficult and easy
non-moral decisions are compared with one another (Table 12),
which suggests that there is something specific about difficult moral
decisions which engage the TPJ. What then distinguishes moral cog-
nition from other forms of socially relevant decisions? While social
interaction affects others, moral decisions are distinctive in that they
can altruistically motivate interpersonal behavior (Moll et al., 2008).
Accordingly, stimuli that are highly relevant and attentionally demand-
ingsocial cues, norms and taboosnecessitate processing according to
their level of significance. This would mean that moral phenomena
specifically require increased attentional resources because they are
more consequential than non-moral phenomena. Thus, difficult deci-
sions made within the moral domain are considerably more relevant
and meaningful than difficult decisions made outside the moral
domain. Hence, the TPJ appears to subserve the attention-oriented
comparison of highly salient and meaningful moral stimuli.
Together, our results suggest that moral cognition emerges from the
integration and coordination of disparate neural systems. This account
extends the current moral cognitive framework by illustrating that not
only do the TPJ and vmPFC have specific and differential roles but that
they also operate within a flexible and competitive neural system.
Dilemmas with a clearly guided moral choice require minimal process-
ing of social information, and as a result, entail little cognitive demand.
In contrast, moral dilemmas with ambiguously unfavorable outcomes
demand greater deliberation and seemingly depend on an explicitly
reflective system (Evans, 2008). The fact that the relationship between
the TPJ and vmPFC appears to function within a dynamic equilib-
riumwhen the TPJ is more engaged the vmPFC is less engaged, and
vice versaimplies that moral decision making relies on a system of
neural reallocation or mutual inhibition. Portions of the vmPFC and
TPJ are specifically connected (Price and Drevets, 2010), and work has
illustrated spontaneous correlations of activity between the TPJ and
vmPFC (Burnett and Blakemore, 2009; Mars et al., 2012). Although
speculative, such evidence of TPJ-vmPFC functional connectivity sup-
ports the idea that these regions may work together to encode moral
choices. Interestingly, an experiment where the TPJ was transiently
disrupted caused subjects to judge attempted harms as more morally
permissible (Young et al., 2010). This suggests that when the TPJ ‘turns
off’, neural resources may re-allocate to the vmPFC (where pro-social
judgments may be generated). Such a mutual inhibitory process would
mean that differential moral behavior competes for neural resources
and thus rely on discrete and dissociable systems. Although beyond the
scope of this research, it is possible that information processing taking
place in these two classes of moral dilemmas act in direct opposition.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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